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CHINA However, when we asked which specific aspects HMG prioritises for protection from China, the picture was startling. In December 2020, the Deputy National Security Adviser admitted:

''I think in the past we have perhaps not had as rigorous a process at identifying across the board what needs to be protected based on our sovereign interest. We've had a very sophisticated process in some areas, so for example Critical National Infrastructure, which includes energy and so on. We've been weaker in other areas, for example emerging technology, potentially strategic suppliers and interdependences and data and telecoms infrastructure particularly.''

We consider this later in the part of the Report dealing with the Government's response.

It is clear that China employs a range of overt and covert methods to gain political influence and economic advantage over the UK and that China's ambition and reach extends into a wide range of sectors in the UK, including Academia, Industry and Technology, and Civil Nuclear energy (each explored in the Case Studies in Part Two of this Report). China's activity is made possible by the nature and scale of its intelligence apparatus, which is explored in detail in the next chapter.

China is seeking both political influence and economic advantage in order to achieve its aims in relation to the UK. It seeks to acquire information and influence elites and decision-makers, and to acquire Intellectual Property using covert and overt methods to gain technological supremacy.