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Rh In terms of Academia, this is the subject of a specific Case Study in Part Two of the Report. At this point, however, we note that Academia provides China with a key means of exerting influence: Chinese attempts to interfere with, and stifle debate, amongst the academic community in the UK are a significant problem, made possible by China's academic 'buying power'. Chinese students make up the largest overseas (non-EU) contingent in UK universities and are responsible for generating almost £600m—a very significant proportion of universities' income. China is actively using this income as leverage to gain political influence and control and to direct the narrative.

However, China does not simply exert control and influence through student fees, it also provides direct investment to academic institutions so that it can guarantee input into academic programmes, direct research and ensure that UK students are taught an interpretation of China that reflects the CCP's interests. In addition to seeking political influence at an institutional level, China also targets individual academics who study the country, seeking to ensure that they act in the CCP's best interests either through professional inducements or, if that doesn't work, by intimidation, including using Chinese visas as leverage. The threat of not allowing an academic to travel to China—when that is their area of expertise—is a very powerful threat. Our Case Study on Academia explores the scale of China's political influence in this area.

In terms of the use of investment activities as a platform, this can clearly be seen from the political influence China gains from its very significant investment in the UK's Civil Nuclear sector—seeking to ensure that the UK is economically reliant on China. In a bid to become a global supplier, China is looking to capitalise on the UK's international leadership and seeks to use UK regulatory approval for Chinese technology in this sector to enable the export of Chinese technology to other Western markets—thereby increasing China's political influence. We explore China's influence in this sector in our Case Study on Civil Nuclear energy.

China is engaged in a battle for technological supremacy with the West—one which it appears to be winning. China's 'Made in China 2025' strategy is an initiative designed to help China become a manufacturing superpower through investing in, and then leveraging, foreign industries and foreign industry expertise in order to help China master complex design and manufacturing processes more quickly. China targets other countries’ technology, Intellectual Property (IP) and data in order to "bypass costly and time-consuming research, development and training". This approach means it can exploit foreign expertise, gaining economic and technological advantages and thereby achieving prosperity and growth more quickly—and at the expense of others.

Chinese dominance of technology has far-reaching consequences: a key issue in the 5G/Huawei decision was that there were few other options, such is the dominance of China