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CHINA China prioritises acquiring information on traditional targets of espionage - such as political decision-making and defence. In seeking to establish HMG's position, it casts its net widely. We were told that China hoovers up:

''very large amounts of mostly not very damaging information in isolation. There is a big thing here about the aggregation of vast amounts of small insights, but alongside that you cannot be blind to the possibility of small amounts of very deep insights.''

(China also uses its acquisition of large amounts of data to enable it to identify, and track, targets: this is covered in the Case Study on Industry and Technology in Part Two of the Report.)

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In recent years, it appears that there has been a general rise in attempts to penetrate the Government or the UK Intelligence Community ***. UK students studying in China can also be targeted. ***. *** both SIS and MI5 told us that the ChIS were most aggressive in ***. ***

In terms of cultivating influence, HMG told us that the ChIS use the following methods:

covert support for foreign political parties; covert funding and support of groups favourable to the CCP; using trade negotiations or investment activities as a platform to influence key decision-makers through bribery and corruption; co-opting academics, think-tank employees, former officials and former military figures; using cultural and friendship institutions to access key thinkers and decision-makers; obtaining and releasing materials to discredit individuals opposed to China's views; funding of universities, both to influence research direction towards Chinese priorities and to gain access to prominent individuals through philanthropy, and covert media manipulation to undermine support for policies and views deemed harmful to China.

In terms of political parties, support groups, institutions, officials and the media, we consider these methods in more detail later, in the chapter on Interference.