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Rh Without swift and decisive action, we are on a trajectory for the nightmare scenario where China steals blueprints, sets standards and builds products, exerting political and economic influence at every step. Such prevalence in every part of the supply chain will mean that, in the export of its goods or services, China will have a pliable vehicle through which it can also export its values. This presents a serious commercial challenge, but also has the potential to pose an existential threat to liberal democratic systems.

We welcome the Government's attribution of attacks to the Chinese hacking group APT10. Public condemnation of such groups explicitly linked to the Chinese government is an essential tool in tackling the increasing cyber threat from China. The Government should continue to work with allies to highlight and condemn hostile Chinese government activity.

The threat posed by Chinese targeting of experts in UK Industry is of concern. While the expulsion of intelligence officers and the disruption of Chinese efforts are to be commended, the lack of prosecutions is worrying. We note that the Government is intending to introduce new legislation that will make it easier to prosecute such behaviour. Convictions under such new legislation would act as a strong deterrent to those contemplating engaging in such relationships.

The scale of investments by the China General Nuclear Power Group in the UK Civil Nuclear sector—and its willingness to undergo expensive and lengthy regulatory approval processes—demonstrates China's determination to become a permanent and significant player in the UK Civil Nuclear sector, as a stepping stone in its bid to become a global supplier. Involvement will provide China with an opportunity to develop its expertise and gain both experience and credibility as a partner.

The question is to what extent the Government is prepared to let China invest in such a sensitive sector, for the sake of investment, and whether the security risks have been clearly communicated to Ministers—and understood. The Government would be naïve to assume that allowing Chinese companies to exert influence over the UK's Civil Nuclear and Energy sectors is not ceding control to the Chinese Communist Party.

Using the fact that Hinkley Point C will be operated by a French company as justification for allowing Chinese involvement was obfuscatory: the Government clearly knew that that decision would lead to it allowing the use of Chinese technology and Chinese operational control at Bradwell B. It is astonishing that the investment security process for Hinkley Point C did not therefore take Bradwell B into account. It is unacceptable for the Government still to be considering Chinese involvement in the UK's Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) at a granular level, taking each case individually and without regard for the wider security risk. It is imperative that linked investments are considered in the round and that Ministers are consulted on the cumulative security risk brought by linked Chinese investments. Effective Ministerial oversight in this area is still lacking, more than eight years on from the Committee's Report on the national security implications of foreign involvement in the UK's CNI.