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Rh HMG must explore the possibility of a multi-year Spending Review for the Agencies, in order to allow them to develop long-term, strategic programmes on China and respond to the enduring threat. The UK is severely handicapped by the short-termist approach currently being taken.

MI5 is responsible for countering Hostile State Activity, and the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure and the National Cyber Security Centre play a key role in engaging with those within and outside the Government to protect national security. There is a wide array of defensive tools, which are being used to good effect, but the Government has come late to the party and has a lot of catching up to do. Our closest allies identified the need to use such tools against China long ago and we must learn from their experience and knowledge.

It is also clear that this defensive effort requires a cross-government approach. However, this transfer of responsibility will need to be a well-thought-out, gradual process with adequate support provided to the departments and some degree of control retained at the centre. HMG needs to ensure that those departments not traditionally associated with security are properly resourced with security expertise, properly supported and properly scrutinised.

Chinese law now requires its citizens to provide assistance to the Chinese Intelligence Services (ChIS) and to protect state secrets. It is highly likely that the ChIS will use such legislation to compel the Chinese staff of UK companies to co‑operate with them. It is also likely that China's Personal Information Protection Law will lead to the Chinese government forcing Chinese and other companies to turn over their data held on Chinese citizens. As compartmentalisation of Chinese citizens' data will be difficult, this is likely to mean that, in practice, China will obtain access to data held on non-Chinese citizens as well.

The UK Intelligence Community have been open with the Committee about the challenges of detecting Chinese interference operations. ***

It is incumbent on the Government to report on how national security decision-making powers are being dispersed across the Government. It should annually update this Committee on the number of personnel cleared to see Top Secret material in each of the departments with new national security decision-making powers, together with the facilities provided to them (secure IT terminals and telephones etc.).

Failure to get this transition right from the outset could lead to decisions that fail to withstand external challenge. Furthermore, as there is an adjustment in national security responsibility, so too must there be an adjustment to ensure there is effective Parliamentary oversight of all aspects.

It is clear that there has been progress in terms of 'offensive' work since we started our Inquiry—for instance, an increase in 'effects' work. However, given what appears to be the extremely low starting point, this is not cause for celebration ***. Both SIS and GCHQ say that working on China "is a slow burn, slow-return effort" ***.