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CHINA The Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 does not contain provision for effective oversight of the new measures being implemented. The Act provides that notification of a company or person being a 'high-risk vendor' of telecommunications equipment, and specification of the limits placed on the use of this equipment, be laid before Parliament unless provision of this information is deemed to be contrary to national security. In such circumstances it is logical—and in keeping with Parliament's intent in establishing the ISC—that this information should instead be provided to the ISC. This would ensure that Parliament could be duly notified without this information being made public and thereby endangering national security. However, this proposed amendment was rejected wholesale by the Government. This was particularly inappropriate—and, indeed, ironic—as it was the ISC that had originally raised concerns about the adoption of Huawei in the UK telecommunications network. It was our initiative that prompted the Government to introduce this legislation.

In December 2020, we asked how the policy outcomes against which SIS and GCHQ must deliver intelligence were being prioritised. We presume, for instance, that "***" is not considered to be of the same importance as "***"; however, we have not been provided with any information. Without any indication of prioritisation, it is difficult to judge the effectiveness of Agency efforts and it is therefore disappointing—and rather telling—that NSS has failed to provide such critical information in response to this major Inquiry.

We were told in 2019 that the Agencies take a tri-Agency approach, but this does not cover DI. In October 2020—over 15 months later—we asked if there had yet been any movement towards formally adding DI to the prioritisation process. The Acting National Security Adviser told us: "DI are fully part of the IOP process … they are one of our main repositories of expertise on China." Director GCHQ noted that DI is a part of the National Cyber Force, and "when you get into the effects world … they are completely there in every aspect". If DI is supposedly now fully integrated with the Intelligence Outcomes Prioritisation process, we expect the next iteration of the tri‑Agency approach—when it is finally updated—to include DI.

As at 2021, the Government had a plethora of plans that laid out its China policies. The interaction between these documents has required a great deal of unpicking, and we have been surprised at the fact that changes in one document do not always lead to consequent changes in others. The slow speed at which strategies, and policies, are developed and implemented also leaves a lot to be desired—at the time of writing we await to see what impact the National Security Adviser’s review of processes will have on the China policy area, but we would certainly hope it will become more coherent.

The level of resource dedicated to tackling the threat posed by China's 'whole-of-state' approach has been completely inadequate. While a shortage of resources had been identified as early as 2012, effort was diverted onto the acute counter-terrorism threat arising from Syria. The increase in funding on the China mission in 2020 was therefore both necessary and welcome. But it was only for one year. HMG cannot think or plan strategically with such short-term planning.