Page:ISC-China.pdf/198

CHINA vaccine discovery and manufacture, and organisations involved in the vaccine supply chain."

The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has publicly identified Russian efforts to target UK vaccine work (and indeed Russian disinformation around the vaccine, with the aim of undermining public confidence in it, appeared to be the primary hostile state threat in this area ***), but there have also been allegations in the press that China has used information supplied to the WHO in order to guide its targeting of companies and institutions working on coronavirus vaccines. The JIO told us ***.

While China would seemingly gain no clear advantage in sabotaging efforts to create a vaccine – given the benefits it would likely reap—it is nevertheless very interested in the UK's vaccine development. MI5 told us that:

"***"

Furthermore, China stands to gain clear benefits from medical espionage while there remain exploitable commercial opportunities in connection with the pandemic. Both Russia and China appear to have used 'medical diplomacy' in the context of Covid-19 to further their own positions: offers of personal protective equipment or medical support may appear to be generous on the surface, but may have conditions attached. CDI told us that the ***.

The UK Intelligence Community should be commended for the proactive measures they have taken to defend the UK’s medical infrastructure and capabilities from possible interference. NCSC increased its support to the UK Government Vaccine Taskforce, which makes decisions on research funding and purchase of vaccines, and to universities involved in the research and development of a vaccine. The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure is helping to secure Covid-19 testing, treatment and vaccine research and development, and ***.

Indeed, the pandemic has raised an important issue: namely that sectors that are not traditionally considered 'critical' became hugely significant in co-ordinating and facilitating the UK's response. As a consequence, support was rapidly required from Government to counter the interest shown in them by—and threat from—a wide range of actors, including hostile states. GCHQ noted:

These are companies that are generally not classed as Critical National Infrastructure but became essential to the UK's response to the Covid-19 crisis including: supermarkets, haulage companies to ventilator manufacturers, healthcare suppliers and charities. No priority list of these existed, we had to work with a range of