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Rh submarines are built; the two sites are 20 miles apart). These are legitimate concerns ***. The JIC concluded that ***.

However, even if the UK makes a decision in regards to Chinese investment in nuclear based on its own national security concerns, the Chinese will see it as stemming from US concerns and pressure. In 2020, the JIC assessed:

"No matter how any [hypothetical] action [opposing a Chinese role at Bradwell] is presented to China ***"

Public attention has focused primarily on the Civil Nuclear sector, as does this Case Study. However, during our inquiry we did consider whether there was a similar threat to UK's non-nuclear Energy sector. In simple terms, the 'Energy' Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) sector comprises all UK infrastructure associated with Energy which is not Civil Nuclear. There are three sub-sectors—electricity, gas and oil.

China's interest in the non-nuclear Energy sector is primarily driven by its huge domestic demand for energy: China alone accounts for 25% of global daily energy consumption; its electricity requirements have quadrupled since 2000; it is the world's biggest consumer and producer of coal, which accounts for three-fifths of its energy use; and it is the world's largest oil importer. However, with severe pollution and environmental damage posing a possible threat to popular support for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it has also invested heavily in renewables (with the result that it now has a quarter of the world's solar panels, and a third of the world's wind turbines).