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CHINA blind to the possibility that the Chinese investments in Hinkley Point, Bradwell and Sizewell could be used as political leverage over the UK Government, both on the narrow issue of the Civil Nuclear sector itself, and on broader Chinese issues: first, in the initial stages, as the threat of withholding or withdrawing funding could place the future of a project (and its intended outcome) in jeopardy; and second, once construction has finished and generation begins, by having control of the sites that generate a substantial proportion of the UK's electricity and therefore potentially holding it to ransom.

The potential for involvement in one industry to be used as leverage to gain a foothold in another industry can be clearly seen from the Chinese messaging in 2020, when the Chinese Ambassador to the UK told business leaders that a UK decision to ban Huawei could undermine plans for Chinese companies to build nuclear power plants and the HS2 high-speed rail network.

There is also a geostrategic concern around the UK becoming reliant on China for the ongoing maintenance of Chinese-built nuclear reactors (particularly given the very long operating life of nuclear reactors). This reliance could give China another 'lever' to apply pressure if diplomatic relations decline in future.

It could also be argued that the very fact that China will be able to exert some control over the UK's CNI will complicate the Government's calculations when trying to challenge Chinese behaviour in other areas—for example, in relation to human rights. In other words, it may not be possible to separate the Civil Nuclear sector from wider geopolitical and diplomatic considerations.

The Committee asked the Intelligence Community if there had been any indications that China would use its foothold in the Civil Nuclear sector to exert pressure in other areas. We were told that that was a question for the (then) Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) to answer. Unfortunately, the Government has refused to allow this Committee access to BEIS—this is yet another example of the failure of the Fusion Doctrine when it comes to oversight.

Part of the concern about the influence and control that Chinese investment in the UK Civil Nuclear sector might secure is around the threat of disruption. Disruption could mean temporarily shutting down a power network (at a localised or even national level) or causing irreparable damage to an energy-production facility, which could result in an energy shortage and/or a greater burden on alternative energy production. Depending on the means used to disrupt an energy-production facility, there could well be an impact on the local environment.

During the course of this Inquiry, we were concerned that increased physical access to nuclear power stations could aid the exercise of these capabilities, whether to disrupt energy supply or to cause physical or environmental damage. Physical access to nuclear sites would presumably mean that an individual with the right access might be able to shut the system down. While the degree of disruption would depend on the incident ***. Furthermore, it