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CHINA "There is no ability … to be a big enterprise in China without complete interdependency with the state, and you will have seen that a lot in the kind of conversation around Huawei.

So in terms of state control, state influence, state ability to use any bit of industry, to deliver a wider state ambition, that is as true of Chinese [General] Nuclear as it is of any other large organisation in China."

While Chinese investment in Hinkley Point C might open the door for the UK to allow CGN to build and operate, Bradwell B would be opening a direct channel from the UK nuclear enterprise to the Chinese state. MI5 explained:

"There is a Chinese state law around sharing data with the state, and that applies to all industries and all organisations. ***. There are expectations around sharing of expertise; so if you have got a particular individual in your industry who is developing a capability that the state is interested in, particularly for dual use, *** there would be an expectation of sharing."

China is unlikely to glean commercially valuable information directly from its investments, but Chinese involvement in the sector inevitably increases the risk of espionage by providing legitimate cover for Chinese nationals whose primary role may be to conduct espionage activity (either against the Civil Nuclear sector in particular, or UK targets more broadly) and access to facilities and Intellectual Property (IP) that may not otherwise have been available.

As noted above, CGN, as a state-owned enterprise, is ***. ***.

MI5 noted that there had been instances *** where employees in the Civil Nuclear sector had conducted espionage (the Allen Ho case study below is one such example), and we questioned witnesses as to whether such cases had been seen in the UK. They stated that ***. MI5 explained that experts are cultivated in all fields:

That can start from university … how to look at the right university students and what subjects they are studying.