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CHINA order to secure agreement for a Chinese reactor at Bradwell] … That's a pretty major ommitment.

This notion of a link between the different investments is significant: Chinese investment in Hinkley Point would appear to be predicated on an understanding that they would subsequently receive permission to use their own technology at Bradwell—i.e. Bradwell is the key, and if Bradwell was not able to proceed for some reason then they may not be interested in Hinkley Point. ***.

While the Intelligence Community's argument that ownership is not the primary concern may be persuasive with regard to the Hinkley Point C decision, it seriously undermines the case for allowing Chinese involvement in Bradwell B, where—as things stand—a Chinese company will exercise operational control over a Chinese-designed reactor. Using the fact that Hinkley Point C will be operated by a French company as a justification for allowing Chinese involvement was obfuscatory, as it is clear from the Government's own evidence that China considers the Hinkley Point C and Bradwell B investments to be directly linked. The Government was therefore entering into an agreement on Hinkley Point C in the clear knowledge that it was—diplomatically and politically—entering into an agreement on allowing the use of Chinese technology, and the exercise of Chinese operational control, at Bradwell B (subject to further regulatory requirements being met by the Chinese).

It has also been suggested that this apparent quid pro quo could bind the Government legally into approving CGN's plans for Bradwell B, due to the legal principle of 'legitimate expectation'—under which the investment of large sums on the basis of a Government understanding can be taken to be an enforceable contract. We questioned the Deputy National Security Adviser (DNSA) on the extent to which these factors were considered by Government when approving Chinese investment in Hinkley Point C:

STEWART HOSIE: … why was there no mention of Bradwell or the security risks involved in Chinese operation in the October 2016 Cabinet Office note on Hinkley Point, even though the Government consistently assessed at the time that China viewed its assessment in Hinkley as being linked to Bradwell?

''DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER: So to be clear, there has been no investment security process in relation to Bradwell. The investment security process was purely related to the Hinkley C question. So we have not taken a judgement on that.''

STEWART HOSIE: I understand there has been no investigation potentially into Bradwell; the question was why was there no reference to Bradwell in the Hinkley C report, given that the Government assessed in the Chinese mind these two things were inexorably linked?