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CHINA to effect disruptions; in practice, many of these are the same as for other forms of espionage. These sit under a range of HMG tools, which are outlined earlier in this Report, and include:

interviews: there may be a discussion arranged with an individual ***; the removal of security clearance from British nationals with access to sensitive information who pose a national security risk, including those who may have been in contact with foreign intelligence services (***); the lawful expulsion of intelligence officers should they be found to engage in activities contrary to the UK national interest; the issuing of MI5 'Espionage Alerts' to affected industries and foreign partners, to increase awareness of the activities of suspected intelligence officers ; and visa action: as is standard, the Home Office can consider revoking a visa on the grounds that someone’s presence in the UK is 'not conducive to the public good' (***); and official reprimands, under which a warning is conveyed to foreign liaison officers regarding the activities of foreign intelligence services.

A British national *** was determined to have been in contact with the Chinese Intelligence Services (ChIS) for a number of years. The individual had travelled to China frequently *** and had offered to talent-spot other experts on behalf of the ChIS. HMG carried out an interview with the individual at the end of 2018 ***.

GCHQ engages in cyber operations that expose and disrupt the activities of Chinese state-sponsored hackers. This acts both as a 'tactical' tool, in that it counters individual groups, and 'strategic', in that it has the potential to undermine the credibility of such groups within China—with ramifications for China's credibility as a state actor ostensibly opposed to cyber operations. The Intelligence Community have noted that they have dedicated significant effort to identifying and building knowledge of the Chinese cyber actors ***. ***. The naming of APT10 in December 2018 is a key result of this Intelligence Community effort.

In 2020, DI told the Committee that it provides Analysis & Assessment to MoD and HMG partners (such as CPNI, JSTAT and the ISG) and policy-makers on the threat to the UK defence industry from China. In one such example, DI provided assessment on a case that allowed the (then) Secretary of State for BEIS to intervene in the acquisition of a British company (***) by a Chinese-owned company (***). A public interest intervention notice was issued under the Enterprise Act 2002, meaning that the transaction was subject to a