Page:ISC-China.pdf/157

Rh successfully … generated more awareness and more leads for us to pursue into possible intelligence activity.

CPNI also briefs Industry where intelligence indicates there is specific Chinese intent to target certain companies or sectors. For example, NCSC worked with CPNI to assess security practices at a *** site. This involved a comprehensive review of site risks ***. As a result, additional measures were put in place at the site. However, given the wide range of individuals, assets and organisations, it is clearly difficult to detect and disrupt every incident.

DI also provides briefings to industry and government partners where it has information and expertise to share. CDI told the Committee that DI provides focused intelligence briefings to elements of the defence industry in order to ensure that they understand the level of threat posed to them, and also to provide oversight and assurance "to ensure that they're adopting the appropriate security protocols to protect themselves".

In addition, DI provides security advice to Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S), a part of MoD that provides security accreditation for defence contractors and controls access of foreign nationals to UK defence industry sites through the International Visits Control Office (IVCO).

In September 2020, MI5 told the Committee that "in line with HMG policy, we are now seeking to identify where MI5 can add further value to defend our economic resilience". Director General MI5 described this as "widening the aperture", a process he said was necessary given "Chinese investments in our economy are as much of a threat as Intellectual Property stolen across a cyber domain or by a spy".

In addition to providing support to the Government's investment security processes through the aforementioned joint CPNI and NCSC team, and providing advice to Industry, MI5 also has a key role in disrupting the most acute economic espionage threats from China. In relation to IP and data theft, MI5 say it focuses on: ***.

Under current UK law, it is not a criminal offence to be an agent of a foreign intelligence service, and, as such, prosecution of suspected Chinese spies committing economic espionage in the UK is rarely possible. While the Government has committed to bringing in new legislation to rectify this, and MI5 has supported the introduction of a specific 'economic espionage offence', at present MI5 has to rely on a range of non-legislative tools