Page:ISC-China.pdf/145



While China is adept at exploiting legitimate routes to advance technologically, it also utilises the full range of its espionage capabilities. The NCSC told the Committee:

"to fulfil any national strategic outcome … [the Chinese Communist Party] will use the [intelligence] capabilities they've got-be it cyber espionage [or] human espionage—and they really don't seek a distinction... of using those capabilities for purely national security reasons. They see the whole spectrum of strategic national outcomes as being fair game for those capabilities."

China uses its covert capabilities to target other countries' technology, IP and data in order to—as previously noted—"bypass costly and time-consuming research, development and training". This gives it a significant commercial advantage and, over time, strategic advantage.

This looks set to continue—and to increase: ***. ***.

The ChIS have *** human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities. They seek to identify individuals who have access to sensitive information which is of particular value to them—"*** providing easier access to otherwise restricted UK military or commercially sensitive information". For example, China uses opportunities provided by ***, or by social media to recruit individuals. MI5 told us that:

"the use of LinkedIn, the social/professional networking site, for example, is very widespread … well over *** UK-based individuals [have been] the subject of a very light initial approach ***, where someone is presenting [themselves] as maybe a consultant who is interested in an article this person may have written or wishes to invite them to a conference and … seeing whether they can suck this person into some … form of communication away from the LinkedIn site, perhaps email—and then maybe, if this develops, there is an invitation to a conference or a seminar, or somebody gets paid a small sum for writing an article …"

***. ***.