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CHINA the fact that it provides its information to the BEIS Select Committee and to the Science and Technology Committee. We also note that its response was provided on an email system accredited only to 'Official-Sensitive', yet it referenced information in our more highly classified communication. We are worried that a department charged with security matters would make such a basic error. The BEIS Select Committee may wish to assure itself as to the security processes in place with the department to avoid such errors.

We have previously addressed the lack of oversight resulting from the Fusion Doctrine. The responses from DfE and BEIS in relation to our Inquiry into China—one of the key national security threats facing the UK—are clear examples of the unacceptable nature of the current system, both in terms of the failure of policy departments to be alert to security matters and to take responsibility for tackling them, and the lack of effective oversight if this Committee is not formally given a remit in this area.

In terms of tackling Chinese influence over, and interference in, many of our academic institutions, while the dawning recognition that there is a problem is welcome, the Committee has still not seen any detail as to what action is planned to tackle it—which reinforces our concern that policy departments are not taking it sufficiently seriously.

In the evidence received, the only step that was pointed to was the championing of the importance of freedom of speech and academic freedom in our academic institutions, which, as the (then) Universities Minister noted, "are a huge part of what makes our higher education system so well-respected around the world". The UK Government says that, in order to protect free speech, it has worked with Universities UK on guidelines that provided advice on a wide range of national security issues, including the protection of values (this guidance is discussed further below). In addition, the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill was introduced in the House of Commons in May 2021 and is making progress. At the time of writing, it was still at Report stage in the House of Commons.

Nevertheless, the scant response from the Government demonstrates there is still a long way to go before we can stem the tide of Chinese political influence in UK academic institutions bought by Chinese money—money that China uses to control and validate its own political narrative and to shut down criticism. The introduction of the Government's Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill is not—in and of itself—going to solve this systemic problem.

As at 2021, HMG still seemed to be at the stage of trying to understand the threat from Chinese students stealing IP from UK Academia, or the Chinese subverting UK research to