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In 2019, the External Expert witnesses we spoke to told the Committee that the Government had shown very little interest in their warnings that China was actively attempting to influence and utilise Academia in the UK for its own purposes: Lord Patten noted that there was not even point of contact in the Government for advice on these issues.

HMG appears now to recognise that Chinese engagement with the UK's academic sector—while yielding many benefits—is not without risk. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office noted in 2020:

"in the UK we are aware of cases such as autocratic state actors putting pressure on universities and academics to avoid certain topics or self-censor their research or course content. There are also reports of pressure or influence exerted on overseas students. We are also aware of autocratic state actors targeting research collaboration."

However, as in so many areas, the devolution of responsibility for security to policy departments means that the security aspects are being lost. In July 2019, the DNSA and Senior Responsible Owner for China told us that "the Department for Education and BEIS [the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy] are the ones who we have tasked to be the lead government departments to understand the threat from influence and interference in the academic sector". However, in December 2020, 18 months later, the DNSA told the Committee:

"we need DfE [the Department for Education] to be able to understand that agenda, to have a high level of awareness of the risks of the potential of intelligence and a covert capability to support them in that."

It appears therefore that the policy departments still do not have the understanding needed. This problem can be seen by the lack of engagement we have received during this Inquiry from DfE and the (then) Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS). In April 2021, we contacted both departments to request information on issues on which they are the 'lead' departments. At the time of writing, we were still waiting to receive a response from DfE—despite having chased this request with the Secretary of State's office. No explanation has been provided for the department's failure to engage with this Inquiry. This is particularly concerning when DfE is supposed to play a pivotal role in countering nefarious Chinese activity in academic institutions.

BEIS did respond to our requests—only to refuse them outright. The department refused to provide any information to the Committee, citing commercial sensitivities and