Page:ISC-China.pdf/119

Chinese Interference in UK Academia

don't judge are causing deep damage … there are other cases where we think there is more concerning activity taking place ***.

Engagement with think tanks in order to promote a particular view of the world is not unusual behaviour and would not generally reach the threshold for 'interference'. However, Chinese tactics extend to intimidation and coercion. For example, we were told that staff from at least one European think tank focusing on China are frequently followed by Chinese officials, and others have experienced difficulties obtaining Chinese visas. Charles Parton, Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) told the Committee about one employee who "knows if she wishes to return to China, temporarily or when she retires, she cannot say things that go against the Party, and she has told me, 'I have to clear things with my protector back in Beijing' … that is the way the Party forces [ethnic Chinese academics] to act".

PP. The UK's academic institutions provide a rich feeding ground for China to achieve political influence in the UK and economic advantage over the UK. China exerts influence over institutions, individual UK academics and Chinese students in order to control the narrative of debate about China—including through the use of Confucius Institutes in the UK—and it directs or steals UK academic research to obtain Intellectual Property in order to build, or short-cut to, Chinese expertise. However, the academic sector has not received sufficient advice on, or protection from, either.

QQ. In seeking political influence, there are obvious and repeated examples of Chinese attempts to interfere and stifle debate amongst the academic community in the UK. Universities are reliant on student fees, and the vast number of Chinese students in the UK—it is striking that there are more than five times the number than for any other country—provides China with significant leverage, which it is not afraid to exert. Yet the Government had shown very little interest in warnings from Academia: at the time of drafting, there was no point of contact in the Government for those in the sector to seek advice on these issues.

In addition to influence and interference, Academia also provides China with a means of securing economic advantage over the UK. This can be overt—directing academic research for its own ends domestically, whether in an economic sense or militarily. It can also be covert—using collaborative projects to steal information and IP. In both respects, Academia is an easy option' since the information may be less protected than it might be in the private sector or in the Ministry of Defence, for example. Academic institutions often conduct research on behalf of UK Industry, and we were told that they can be more vulnerable than their Industry counterparts due to a combination of greater need for funding ***.