Page:ISC-China.pdf/113



As we have noted in Part One, the UK is a target for China in its efforts to build global support for its core interests, to mute international criticism and to gain economically. To achieve these aims, China seeks 'political influence' in the UK and 'economic advantage' over the UK. During this Inquiry, we have examined the influence and advantage China seeks through three areas: Academia, Industry and Technology, and Civil Nuclear energy. We explore the threat and response to these three key areas in the subsequent Case Studies, starting with Chinese interference in UK Academia.

The UK's academic institutions provide a rich feeding ground for China to achieve both political influence and economic advantage by both:

controlling the narrative of debate about China within UK universities by exerting influence over institutions, individual UK academics and Chinese students; and obtaining Intellectual Property (IP) by directing or stealing UK academic research in order to build, or short-cut to, Chinese expertise.

These strands can often overlap, and the UK Intelligence Community assess that it is not always clear which is the driver: "it is difficult to know if interference is the priority or whether it is a by-product of trying to acquire sensitive material and expertise".

What is clear from our Inquiry is that the academic sector has not received sufficient advice on, or protection from, either.

The External Expert witnesses who gave evidence to the Committee were very clear that Chinese attempts to interfere and stifle debate amongst the academic community in the UK are a significant problem, and they provided us with numerous examples.

By contrast, historically, the Intelligence Community considered that, while China had "***" to interfere in UK Academia, there was not a broad evidence base for this —although it is not clear whether this was because the evidence was not there or the Intelligence Community were not looking for it. In June 2019, we were told by the Deputy National Security Adviser (DNSA) that examining the threat from interference to Academia was a "work in progress" and that there was not a "comprehensive understanding of the picture". However, towards the latter stages of our Inquiry it was recognised that evidence of malign Chinese interference in UK Academia appeared to be growing.

Pressure is primarily exerted on institutions, academics and students to prevent engagement with topics that harm the positive narrative presented by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This is particularly acute when it involves the so-called 'Five Poisons'