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There is effectively a global values struggle going on in which China is determined to assert itself as a world power … China is increasingly thinking of a future in which it could be the world power and that means that—if you think of UK interests as being in favour of good governance and transparency and good economic management, which … serve our national interest because it helps with trade, investment, prosperity and stability and so forth—then I think that China represents a risk on a pretty wide scale.

—Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)

China's national imperative continues to be the continuing dominance and governance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). However, it is its ambition at a global level—to become a technological and economic superpower, on which other countries are reliant—that represents the greatest risk to the UK.

The UK may not be the top priority for China when it comes to espionage and interference, but it is nevertheless of significant interest, mainly given our close relationship with the United States (US): China sees almost all of its global activity in the context of its struggle with the US. The UK is also of interest given its membership of international bodies of significance to China and the perception of the UK as an opinion-former—which plays into China's strategy to reshape international systems in its favour. These factors would appear to place the UK just below China's top priority targets, as it seeks to build support for its current 'core interests': to mute international criticism and to gain economically.

In respect of the latter, China sees the UK as a home for Chinese investment. This approach can be seen in relation to nuclear energy: Chinese interest lies in gaining UK regulatory approval for its reactor designs as it assesses that this will influence other countries to permit Chinese investment in their Civil Nuclear sectors. The same philosophy lay behind Huawei's interest in the UK’s 5G telecommunications network.

At the outset of this Inquiry, the Committee considered whether Huawei should be allowed to supply equipment for the UK's 5G telecommunications network: the key consideration, which lay at the heart of that issue, was the UK's over-reliance on Chinese technology. We urged that action be taken urgently to address this, cautioning: "" China's aspirations are looking ahead to 2049, and the UK needs to be thinking in the same way.

Our Inquiry has continued since then, considering the nature of the threat more broadly (although evidence-taking concluded in 2021—prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in