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CHINA When we asked again, in late 2020, what had now been achieved, GCHQ said that the increase in effort could be seen in all areas of activity, including the collection of intelligence, effects work ***, and in the defensive aspects of the cyber effort. The progress *** meant that:

"we have made massive headway, such that the issue is starting to be how do we deal with the scale of the information at our disposal? How do we get into and focus the effort on the things that we most care about ***."

In terms of other work *** brief reference has been made to work carried out in relation to health (and specifically Covid-19). In 2020, the Deputy National Security Adviser (DNSA) said "… over the last ten months or so of Covid we have certainly seen on the health side some advantage ***". However, no further detail has been supplied.

In October 2020, the Acting NSA told us that a new group, which sits below the China NSIG, had been created to look at *** work, ensuring that it is joined up. One of the reasons why this group had been created was because the Government expected this work "to grow in future".

However, when we asked, again, in 2020, how SIS and GCHQ had performed against the requirements set by the Cabinet Office, we were told that the pandemic meant that there had not been a Cabinet Office review of whether either Agency had met its targets.

II. It is clear that there has been progress in terms of 'offensive' work since we started our Inquiry—for instance, an increase in 'effects' work. However, given what appears to be the extremely low starting point, this is not cause for celebration ***. Both SIS and GCHQ say that working on China "is a slow burn, slow-return effort" ***.

JJ. GCHQ and SIS tasking is set by the Government and, rightly, they cannot work outside the Government's priorities. Nevertheless, the fact that China was such a relatively low priority in 2018—the same year in which China approved the removal of term limits on the Presidency, allowing President Xi Jinping to remain in office as long as he wished—is concerning. Work must continue to be prioritised now to make up for this slow start and there must be clear measurement and evaluation of effort.

Prior to the pandemic, the UK's relationship with China was based on an approach that sought to balance prosperity with national security issues—unlike Russia, which is seen unambiguously as a threat. Although that balance appears to have shifted since, with the