Page:Hot Springs School District v. Sisters of Mercy Female Academy of Little Rock.pdf/3

Rh The undisputed facts show that the property in controversy was not being used exclusively for public charity, and was not intended to be so used. It does not, therefore, come within the provisions of the Constitution exempting such property from taxation. Art. 16, § 5, Const.; 19 L. R. A. 289; 9 Id. 629; 50 Id. 191; 65 Ark. 343; 62 Ark. 481.

Argument for Appellee
Greaves & Martin, and Rose, Hemingway, Cantrell & Loughborough, for appellee.

This institution is a public charity, and as such is exempt from taxation. 14 Allen, 556; 15 Atl. 555; 60 Fed. 365; 120 Mass. 434 ; 17 Atl. 455; 25 O. St. 229; 38 Am. Rep. 298; 125 Pa. 572; 18 Q. B. Div. 444; 134 Pa. 171; 58 Hun, 386; 99 Vt. 202; 98 N. Y. 121; 145 Mass. 149. 

H, J., (after stating the facts.) The judgment appealed from exempts only the ground upon which the hospital building is situate and the building thereon; and the sole question in the case is, whether or not they are used exclusively for public charity.

Appellant contends that the question is answered in its favor by the rule announced in Brodie v. Fitzgerald, 57 Ark. 445. That was a case where the rents and revenues and the property itself were used for public charity. The theory upon which framers of constitutions and lawmakers act in exempting from taxation property used purely for public charity is that the unfortunates, who are the recipients of the bounty of these public charities, would become a charge upon the State, and that by alleviating their suffering and relieving their distress the institutions or other agencies organized for the purpose of public charity in a manner assume part of the public burdens. It is well settled that no one can exempt his property from taxation simply by the exclusive use of the income for public charity; for that is a matter which appeals to his own individual spirit of benevolence. It may be given today and withheld tomorrow. But a different rule prevails where the property is directly and exclusively used for that purpose. It is not denied that the whole object of the institution of appellee is one of public charity; but appellant claims that it is not exclusively so used because pay patients are received, and because those able to pay are charged for prescriptions.