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, which usurps it.”) (internal quotations and alterations omitted); , 364 F.3d at 481–82 (“In considering the fourth factor, our concern is not whether the secondary use suppresses or even destroys the market for the original work or its potential derivatives, but whether the secondary use usurps the market of the original work.”). Here, it is clear to the Court that the Klein video does not serve as a market substitute for the Hoss video; anyone seeking to enjoy “Bold Guy vs. Parkour Girl” on its own will have a very different experience watching the Klein video, which responds to and transforms the Hoss video from a skit into fodder for caustic, moment-by-moment commentary and mockery. Because the Klein video does not “offer[ ] a substitute for the original,” it does not (and indeed, cannot) “usurp a market that properly belongs to the copyright holder.” , 150 F.3d at 110. The fourth factor thus weighs in favor of a determination of fair use.


 * b.

The Court has held that the Klein video constitutes fair use, and further that the Klein video does not infringe plaintiff’s copyrights. Accordingly, it is clear to the Court that Claim II, which alleged that defendants made misrepresentations in their DMCA counter notification, must also be dismissed. It is self-evident that a statement cannot be a “misrepresentation” for purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) if it is factually accurate.

But even if this Court held the Klein video fair use, the Court would still dismiss Claim II because defendants clearly had a subjective “good faith belief” that their video did not infringe plaintiff’s copyrights. , 815 F.3d at 1153. It is undisputed that defendants understand the concept of fair use and have an established practice for ensuring their videos make fair use of copyrighted material. (ECF No. 101 ¶ 28.) It is also undisputed that defendants filed a counter notification on August 26, 2016 alleging that the Klein video constituted fair use. (ECF No. 101 ¶ 49.) This undisputed evidence clearly establishes the subjective “good faith belief” required under 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3)(C). Plaintiff has failed to proffer any evidence that suggests defendants lacked a subjective “good faith belief,” and therefore has failed to create a triable issue. Accordingly, Claim II must additionally be dismissed for that reason.


 * c.

Based on this Court’s review of the Lawsuit video, it is clear that Claim III, in which plaintiff alleges that defendants defamed the plaintiff, must be dismissed. First, as plaintiff has acknowledged, the Lawsuit video is replete with “non-actionable opinion[s].” (ECF No. 99. [sic]);, 449 F.3d at 402 (“New York law absolutely protects statements of pure opinion, such that they can never be defamatory.”) (internal quotation omitted). For example, Ethan Klein’s statement “I think that the heart and soul of this is … he doesn’t like that we made fun of him, and so he’s suing us” is a quintessential statement of pure opinion. Nothing about Ethan Klein’s statement suggests that his opinion is based on any non-public facts about plaintiff, therefore the statement is clearly not actionable as a “mixed opinion.”, 771 F.3d at 129.

The only other allegedly defamatory statement explicitly identified by plaintiff is Ethan Klein’s assertion that