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 gone back when I heard that my troops were stopped at the cross-roads. But being informed by respectable staff officers, that the two brigades were under Genl. Hooker’s immediate control, had I not to suppose that Genl. Hooker knew what he was doing, and whats he wanted them for? Besides, I had communicated to Genl. Hooker's Aide all that was important. That Aide went back to report to his Chief. If anything was wrong, Genl. Hooker, by his Aide, knew where I was, and could advise me. Receiving no farther orders, I was justified in believing that all was right. So I remained where I considered my presence most desirable. That Genl. Hooker meanwhile held my two brigades where he did not want them, is that my mistake?

Whatever way you may turn and twist the occurrences of that night, you will always arrive at the conclusion, that the mistakes committed were not my mistakes, and that of all persons that might be blamed, my troops and their commander were the very last.

I think I could make even Gen. Hooker feel the injustice of the censure contained in his report. What would we have thought, if, at the time of the battle of Chancellorsville, his Corps Commanders had received from Washington direct orders to remain in their position near United States Ford; and if then in Genl. Halleck’s report the following paragraph occurred: “I regret that my duty constrains me to withhold the usual commendation of courage and valor from the Commander of the Army of the Potomac, who, when he heard that Genl. Sedgwick was engaged with the enemy near Fredericksburgh, remained with the whole Army quiet and inactive in his entrenchments at Chancellorville, deaf to the stirring appeals of the terrific artillery and infantry fire in the distance, which made known to him the desperate situation of his imperiled companions?” Or another case in point: How would Genl. Hooker feel, if on the evening of our arrival in Lookout Valley, the Commander of the 11th Corps had received from Genl. Thomas the direct order to camp his whole force near Brown’s Ferry, and if then in Genl. Thomas' official report the following passage had occurred: “I regret that my duty constrains me to except in my general commendation of good judgment the Major-General commanding the 11th and 12th Corps, who, after having marched his troops into Lookout Valley, so far forgot all the rules of ordinary foresight and caution, as to leave a weak detachment isolated at Wauhatchie, without even occupying with sufficient forces the gaps, and fords, and bridges, through and over which the enemy could penetrate into the Valley, place himself between the said camps, and overwhelm the isolated detachment with superior numbers.” How would Genl. Hooker relish that? But if under such