Page:Hooker Inquiry (Wauhatchie Engagement) - Schurz Argument - Page 12.jpg

 time; that brigade is, of all troops, nearest to him. Orders are carried to that brigade by one of General Hooker's aides, and when it is found out that the orders sending the 2d Brigade to Chattanooga arose from a mistake, the brigade is directed to resume its old position. While this is going on I am near Tyndale’s Hill. Notice is brought to me through a staff officer of the 11th Corps that the 3d Brigade is stopped near Smith’s Hill, and under instructions from General Hooker. Almost at the same time notice is brought to me by a staff officer of the 2d Brigade that the 2d Brigade is stopped near Smith’s Hill, and under orders to go to Chattanooga. Can these circumstances be accidental? They speak for themselves.

Nor is this at all strange. Consider the circumstances under which these things happened, and you will find an easy explanation. At first there was no firing except in the direction of Wauhatchie. The attention of everybody was fixed upon that point. My troops are hurried forward to the assistance of Geary. Suddenly, while my column is marching along, a volley is thrown upon it from the hills on the left. All at once it is discovered that this range of hills is occupied by the enemy. This changes the whole aspect of affairs. It is not foreseen in the original programme. The effect of this discovery cannot but be startling. General Hooker himself says in his testimony: “When the first fire was given from the hills on the left, it suggested itself to me that the enemy was trying to get between me and Brown’s Ferry;” and Captain Greenhut testifies, it is his impression to have heard General Hooker say that he expected the enemy to break through between the hills. That would have completely altered the character of the action. The principal and most important fight would have been, not at Wauhatchie, but between the Chattanooga road and Brown’s Ferry; for it was our main object to hold the road between Kelly’s Ferry and Brown's Ferry open. Now imagine General Hooker and staff on the very scene of action with such apprehensions suddenly springing up in their minds. Is is not possible, nay, even probable, that at such a moment General Hooker, thinking of the new danger and considering how to avert it, should have dropped the words: These troops must be stopped here, or something to that effect? Is it not equally probable that some zealous staff officers should have taken such words for an order and hurried off to put the supposed order in execution? Look at Major Howard’s case; it is exactly in this way that he came to stop Hecker, and General Hooker confirmed his action by subsequent instructions of his own. It is not only probable, but almost certain, at least it is my firm belief, that the 2d Brigade which preceded Hecker’s was stopped in a similar manner. General Hooker’s own instructions to Colonel Hecker to be prepared for a