Page:Hook v. United States.pdf/7

 Moore was not bound by it. "[D]istrict courts generally remain free to reconsider their earlier interlocutory orders," and the law-of-the-case-doctrine does not apply “to rulings revisited prior to entry of a final judgment." Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 647 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is so “even when a case is reassigned from one judge to another in the same court . . . so long as prejudice does not ensue to the party seeking the benefit of the doctrine." Id. "The relevant prejudice is limited to lack of sufficient notice that one judge is revisiting the decision of a prior judge and the opportunity to be heard with respect to the new ruling." Id.

Chief Judge Krieger’s statement regarding § 1346(a)(1) was not only interlocutory, it was qualified—she concluded that although the original complaint sufficiently showed a waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity under that statute, it did "not end the Court’s jurisdictional inquiry" because the statute "does not waive any other jurisdictional requirements that are specific to the claims asserted." Aplt. App. at 25. Chief Judge Krieger permitted amendment of the complaint to address alleged jurisdictional defects in plaintiffs’ particular claims. That is precisely what plaintiffs attempted to do in their amended complaint. After the case was reassigned to Judge Moore, the government moved to dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction, thereby giving Ms. Hook sufficient notice that Judge Moore would be revisiting the issue and an opportunity to be heard on that issue. Accordingly, the law-of-the-case doctrine did not foreclose the magistrate judge or Judge Moore from 7