Page:History of the Thirty Years' War - Gindely - Volume 1.djvu/111

 as an ordinary private man, and he became convinced that there would be in Bohemia no more submission to the authority of his sovereign unless this should be brought about by force of arms. Knowing, however, the small resources of the Emperor, he advised him to peaceable measures, and recommended that he issue a patent in which he should solemnly promise to observe the provisions of the Royal Charter and the Adjustment, and refrain from asserting that he had always hitherto observed these laws. The Emperor should, therefore, as Khuen thought, yield, and perhaps the swelling surges in Bohemia would subside.

Matthias would gladly have followed this advice, since it was only in obedience to Khlesl and Ferdinand’s counsels that he had adopted the measures which so irritated the Bohemian Protestants. He would not let it come to arms, but would rather give way, that he might spend the short remainder of his days in measurable quiet. Ferdinand did not, however, share this view. A memorial was at this time prepared, the argument of which amounted to this, that the insurrection must be deemed a fortunate event, since it opened the way to put an end once for all to Bohemian disloyalty, which view he heartily accepted. The author of the memorial maintained that the Emperor would not be the loser if the war should go against him, since he would but lose that the possession of which had no longer any value. But if he should win, he would end forever the slavery in which he had been held. As Ferdinand’s recommendation to employ force against the Bohemian insurgents suited the taste of the Vienna statesmen, the next thing was to consider the resources at command for the war. It was thought that 15,000 disciplined troops and 6,000 Hungarian horse could be brought into