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126 sciences therein, what ground can there be of separation from them for so doing, unless it be lawful to separate from all such who follow an erroneous conscience; and so there can be no end of separations, till all men's consciences judge alike." He then comes to the question, whether there were any cause for entertaining scruples respecting the Oaths. Should there be a reason, he remarks, "it must arise either from the continuing obligation of the former oaths, or from the nature of the present oaths."

The following passages appear to me to meet the case, as it was argued generally against the Nonjurors. He argues, that the rule and measure of oaths are not to be taken from the intention of the framers, but from the general good. "Whatever the intention was, if the keeping of an oath be really and truly inconsistent with the welfare of a people, in subverting the fundamental laws which support it; I do not see how such an oath continues to oblige." He clearly alludes here to the proceedings of King James: and then he shews, that if parents design the ruin of their children, obedience is not to be expected. "But that the public good is the true and just measure of the obligation in these Oaths doth further appear, in that the Oaths are reciprocal. Whereas, if only the good of the persons to whom Oaths of Allegiance are made, were to be our rule, then there would be no mutual oaths." The single point, he says, is; "whether the law of our nation doth not bind us to allegiance to a King or Queen in actual possession of the throne, by consent of the three estates of the realm? and