Page:History of Woman Suffrage Volume 4.djvu/688

 John D. Gougar, husband of the plaintiff, were her attorneys, but she was herself admitted to the bar and argued her own case before Judge F. B. Everett, Jan. 10, 1895. She based her masterly argument on the rights guaranteed to all citizens by the Federal Constitution, and on the first article of the constitution of Indiana, which declares that "the General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens;" and she used with deadly effect the parallel between the-decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Antoinette D. Leach, by which she was enabled to practice law, and the claims which were now being made as to the right of women to vote.

The long, adverse decision of Judge Everett was based upon his declaration that "suffrage is not a natural right or one necessarily incident to such freedom and preservation of rights as are upheld by the National and State constitutions;" that "the intention of their framers to limit the suffrage to males is so strong that it can not be disregarded;" and that "the legal and well understood rule of construction is that the express mention of certain things excludes all others."

Mrs. Gougar then carried her case to the Supreme Court of Indiana, and was herself the first woman admitted to practice before that body. Her brief was filed by her attorneys and she made her own argument before the full bench, the court-room being crowded with lawyers and members of the Legislature. It was said by one of the judges to be the clearest and ablest oral argument presented since he had been a member.

Nevertheless the judgment of the lower court was affirmed. The decision, in which the five judges concurred, was founded almost exclusively upon the affirmation that "that which is expressed makes that which is silent cease." This decision reversed absolutely the one rendered in the case of Leach for the right to practice law, which had declared that "although the statute says voters may practice, it says nothing about women, and therefore there is no denial of this right to them;" or in other words "that which is expressed does not make that which is silent cease."