Page:History of Woman Suffrage Volume 4.djvu/1171

 and regarding common school districts, it is provided that "Every district officer must be a resident of his district and qualified to vote at its meetings." As certain women are qualified to vote in any common school district, such women are thus eligible to any district office, including the offices of trustee, clerk, collector, treasurer or librarian.

A similar provision in reference to union free schools, that "No person shall be eligible to hold any school district office in any union free school district unless he or she is a qualified voter in such district and is able to read and write," permits women to hold office as members of the board of education and other district offices.

Aside from Chapter 214 of the Laws of 1892, which has been held to be unconstitutional, I know of no provision of law extending school suffrage to women in cities, except that charters of certain third class cities have extended to women tax-payers the right to vote upon a proposition involving the raising of a tax.

By the Public Officers' Law, Chap. 681 of the Laws of 1892, Section 3, it is provided that "No person shall be capable of holding a civil office who shall not, at the time he shall be chosen thereto, be of full age, a citizen of the United States, and resident of the State, and, if it be a local office, a resident of the political subdivision or municipal corporation of the State for which he shall be chosen, or within which the electors electing him reside, or within which his official functions are required to be exercised."

In the case of Findlay against Thorn, in the City Court of New York, where the question arose as to the right of a woman to exercise the office of notary public, Chief Justice McAdam refused to pass upon the question, holding that the right could be decided only in a direct proceeding brought for the purpose by the Attorney-General, in which the notary might defend her title. And the court adds:

"Whether a female is capable of holding a public office has never been decided by the courts of this State and it is a question about which legal minds may well differ. The Constitution regulates the right of suffrage and limits it to 'male' citizens. Disabilities are not favored and are seldom extended by implication, from which it may be argued that if it required the insertion of the term 'male' to exclude female citizens of lawful age from the right of suffrage, a similar limitation would be required to disqualify them from holding office. Citizenship is a condition or status and has no relation to age or sex. It may be contended that it was left to the good sense of the Executive and to the electors to determine whether or not they would elect females to office and that the power being lodged in safe hands was beyond danger of abuse.

"If on the other hand it be seriously contended that the Constitution by necessary implication, disqualifies females from holding office, it must follow as a necessary consequence that the Act of the Legislature permitting females to serve as school officers (Chap. 9, Laws of 1880), and all other legislative enactments of like import, removing such disqualifications, are unconstitutional and void. In this same connection it may be argued that if the use of the personal pronoun 'he' in the Constitution does not exclude females from public office, its use in the statute can have no greater effect. The statute, like the Constitution, in prescribing qualifications for office omits the word 'male,' leaving the question whether female citizens of lawful age are included or excluded, one of construction.,

I make these observations for the purpose of showing that the question whether females are eligible to public office in this State, is one not entirely free from doubt and should not therefore be decided where it arises, as it does here, incidentally and collaterally. When the law officers of the State see fit to test the question in direct proceedings for the purpose, it will be time enough to attempt to settle the contention. In such a proceeding, the case of Robinson (131 Mass. 376, and that reported in 107 Mass. 604), where it was held that a woman could not be admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law in Massachusetts,