Page:History of Woman Suffrage Volume 3.djvu/816

Rh I have adverted, that the law perfectly conforms to all the other laws in relation to women upon our statute-book. Studied in connection with the other laws it would seem to have grown naturally from them. It harmonizes entirely with them, and forms a fitting apex to the grand pyramid which is being built up as broadly and as surely throughout all the States of the Union as it has been built up and capped in Wyoming.

The world does not stand still. The dawn of Christianity was the dawn of light for woman. For eighteen centuries she has been gradually but slowly rising from the condition of drudge and servant for man, to become his helpmeet, counselor and companion. As she has been advanced in the social scale, our laws have kept pace with that advancement and conferred upon her rights and privileges with accompanying duties and responsibilities. She has not abused those privileges, and has been found equal to the duties and responsibilities. And the day is not far distant when the refining and elevating influence of women will be as clearly manifested in the political as it now is in the social world.

Urged by all these considerations of right, and justice, and expediency, and the strong conviction of duty, I approved that act of which this bill contemplates the repeal, and it became a law. To warrant my reconsidering that action, there ought to be in the experience of the last two years something to show that the reasons upon which it was founded were unsound, or that the law itself was wrong or at least unwise and inexpedient. My view of the teachings of this experience is the very reverse of this. Women have voted, and have the officers chosen been less faithful and zealous and the legislature less able and upright? They have sat as jurors, and have the laws been less faithfully and justly administered, and criminals less promptly and adequately punished? Indeed the lessons of this two years' experience fully confirm all that has been claimed by the most ardent advocate of this innovation.

In this territory women have manifested for its highest interests a devotion strong, ardent, and intelligent. They have brought to public affairs a clearness of understanding and a soundness of judgment, which, considering their exclusion hitherto from practical participation in political agitations and movements, are worthy of the greatest admiration and above all praise. The conscience of women is in all things more discriminating and sensitive than that of men; their sense of justice, not compromising or time-serving, but pure and exacting; their love of order, not spasmodic or sentimental merely, but springing from the heart; all these,—the better conscience, the exalted sense of justice, and the abiding love of order, have been made by the enfranchisement of women to contribute to the good government and well-being of our territory. To the plain teachings of these two years' experience I cannot close my eyes. I cannot forget the benefits that have already resulted to our territory from woman suffrage, nor can I permit myself even to seem to do so by approving this bill.

There is another, and in my judgment, a serious objection to this bill, which I submit for the consideration and action of your honorable body. It involves a reference to that most difficult of questions, the limitations of legislative power. High and transcendent as that power undoubtedly and wisely is, there are limits which not even it can pass. Two years ago the legislature of this territory conferred upon certain of its citizens valuable rights and franchises. Can a future legislature, by the passage of a law not liable to the objection, that it violates the obligation of contracts, take away those rights? It is not claimed, so far as I have been informed, that the persons upon whom these franchises were conferred have forfeited or failed to take advantage of them. But even if such were the case it would be rather a matter for judicial determination than for legislative action. What that determination would be is clearly indicated in the opinion of Associate-justice Story in the celebrated case of Trustees of Dartmouth College vs. Woodward: "The right to be a freeman of a corporation is a valuable temporal right. * * It is founded on the same basis as the right of voting in public elections; it is as sacred a right; and whatever might have been the prevalence of former doubts, since the time of Lord Holt, such a right has always been deemed a valuable franchise or privilege."