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588 right to vote on the question of license. This prayer, like that of the 7,000, met the fate of all attempts of disfranchised classes to influence legislation. Following this repulse, in some ten or fifteen of the smaller cities of the State, boards of common council were prevailed upon to pass ordinances giving the women the right to vote on the question. Without an exception, the result was overwhelming majorities for "No License." In the cities where officers were elected at the same time, almost without exception, the majority of them were in favor of license, while in those in which the old board of officers held over, no licenses were granted, until the new board elected only by the votes of the men of the city, was installed. Dr. Alice B. Stockham, in her report at the Washington convention of 1885, said:

After the city ordinance of Keithsburg allowed women to vote, the hardest work was to convert the women themselves. Committees were appointed who visited from house to house to persuade women to go to the polls for the suppression of the rule of liquor. On the morning of election they met in a church for conference and prayer. At 10 o'clock forty brave women marched to the polls and cast their first ballot for home protection. Carriages were running to and fro all day to bring the invalid and the aged. For once they were induced to leave the making of ruffles and crazy quilts, to give their silent voice for the suppression of vice. Three weeks later not a woman could be found in the town opposed to suffrage, and for one year not a glass of liquor could be bought in Keithsburg.

Under the act of 1872, the women of Illinois thought their right to pursue every avocation, except the military, secure. But in 1880, a judicial decision proved the contrary. We quote from the National Citizen:

In June, 1879, the Circuit Court of Union County, Judge John Dougherty presiding, appointed Helen A. Schuchardt, resident of the county, to the office of Master in Chancery. Mrs. Schuchardt gave bond with security approved by the court, taking and subscribing the required oath of office. Since that day, she has been the acting Master of Chancery of that county, taking proofs, making judicial rules, and performing the other various duties incident to such office. At the last term of the court the State attorney, at the instance of Mr. Frank Hall, relator, filed an information in the nature of a quo warranto charging that Mrs. Schuchardt had usurped and was unlawfully holding and exercising the office. Mrs. Schuchardt filed pleas setting forth the order of the court appointing her, her bonds with the order of approval, and the oath of office filed by her. To these pleas a general demurrer was interposed and argued.

The questions presented by the demurrer were:First—Is the defendant eligible to this office, she being neither a practicing nor a learned lawyer? Second—Is the defendant eligible to this office, she being a female? The court dismissed the first question on the ground that the statute does not require admission to the bar as a qualification. Of the eleven Masters in Chancery in that Judicial Circuit, it was shown that only five had been admitted to the bar. As to the second objection, i. e., that Mrs. Schuchardt was a female (!) it was decided that the common law never contemplated the admittance of a woman to the office of Master in Chancery, and that doubtless it was the first instance in which a woman had been admitted to the office. It was also decided that the act of March 22, 1872, did not make women eligible to this office; Master in Chancery—for woman—did not mean "occupation, profession, or employment," and that "persons do not select an office, but are selected for the office."

Judge Harker, in delivering this opinion, said: "It is due to Mrs. Schuchardt to say in conclusion, that while I am constrained to sustain this demurrer and hold that under the law she cannot retain this office, there is not one of the Masters in Chancery in the four counties where I preside, who has been more faithful or attentive in the discharge of his duties, and none who has exhibited higher qualifications to dis-