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438 hearing to Mrs. Gougar, who made the journey from Indiana to present the case. The committee reported adversely, but by the able tactics of General Husted, after an animated debate the bill was placed on the calendar by a vote of 66 to 62, and shortly after ordered to a third reading by a vote of 74 to 39. On May 8 the bill was reached for final action. Frederick B. Howe of New York was the principal opponent, trying to obstruct legislation by one and another pretext. General Husted took the floor in an able speech on the constitutionality of the bill, and the vote stood 57 ayes to 61 noes, lacking eight votes of the requisite 65.

While the right of suffrage is still denied, gains in personal and. property rights have been granted:

In 1880, the law requiring the private acknowledgment by a married woman of her execution of deeds, or other written instruments, without the "fear or compulsion "of her husband, was abolished, leaving the wife to make, take and certify in the same manner as if she were a feme sole.

March 21, 1884, the penal code of the State was amended, raising the age of consent from ten to sixteen years, and also providing penalties for inveigling or enticing any unmarried woman, under the age of twenty-five years, into a house of ill-fame or assignation.

Under the act of May 28, 1884, a married woman may contract to the same extent, with like effect and in the same form as if unmarried, and she and her separate estate shall be liable thereon, whether such contract. relates to her separate business or estate, or otherwise, and in no case. shall a charge upon her separate estate be necessary.

It is by court decisions that we most readily learn the legal status of married women, under the favorable legislation of the period covered by this History. While referring the reader to Abbott's Digest of New York Laws for full knowledge upon this point, we give a few of the more recent decisions as illustrating general legal opinion:

March 23, 1882.—The Court of Appeals decided that married women are the rightful owners of articles of personal adornment or convenience coming from husbands, and can bequeath them to their heirs. The court held that separate and personal possession by a wife of articles specially fitted for and adapted to her personal use, and differing in that respect from household goods kept for the common use of husband and wife, would draw after it a presumption of the executed gift if the property came from the husband, and of the wife's ownership, but for disabilities of the marital relations. Now that these disabilities are removed the separate existence and separate property of the wife are recognized, and her capacity to take and hold as her own the gift in good faith and fairly made to her by her husband established, it seemed to the court time to clothe her right with natural and proper attributes, and apply to the gift to her, although made by her husband, the general rules of Jaw unmodified and unimpaired by the old disabilities of the marriage relations.