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332 until he shall take in the said court the following oath," etc. (Col. Records, 1706 to 1716, page 48). This act seems to have contemplated an approval by the court in each particular case in which an attorney appeared before it. The first act with regard to the general admission of attorneys appears in the revision of 1750, and is as follows: "That the county courts of the respective counties in this colony shall appoint, and they are hereby empowered to approve, nominate and appoint attorneys in their respective counties, as there shall be occasion, to plead at the bar; * * and that no person, except in his own case, shall make any plea at the bar in any court but such as are allowed and qualified attorneys, as aforesaid." Thus the statute stood until the revision of 1821; when, for the first time, it took essentially its present form. Up to this time the word "person" had been used in this statute only in the clause that "no person" should be allowed to practice before the courts except where formally admitted by the court, a use of the word which, of course, could not be regarded as limited to the male sex, as women would undoubtedly have been held to be included in the term. The language of the statute as now adopted was as follows: "The county courts may make such rules and regulations as to them shall seem proper relative to the admission and practice of attorneys; and may approve of, admit and cause to be sworn as attorneys, such persons as are qualified therefor agreeably to the rules established; * * and no person not thus admitted, except in his own cause, shall be admitted or allowed to plead at the bar of any court." The statute in this form passed through the compilations of 1835 and 1838, the revision of 1849 and the compilation of 1854, and appears, with a slight modification, in the revision of 1866. The county courts had now been abolished, and the power to admit attorneys, as well as to make rules on the subject, had been given to the Superior Court; the expression, "such persons," being preserved, and the provision that "no person" not thus admitted should be allowed to plead, being omitted.

The statute finally took its present form in the revision of 1875. It retains the provision that the Superior Court may make rules for the admission of attorneys, and provides that the court "may admit and cause to be sworn as attorneys such persons as are qualified therefor agreeably to the rules established," and restores the provision, dropt in the revision of 1866, that "no person other than an attorney so admitted shall plead at the bar of any court in this State, except in his own cause."

These changes, though not such as to affect the meaning of the statute at any point of importance to the present question, are yet not wholly without importance. The adoption by the legislature of the revision of the statutes becomes, both in law and in fact, a reënactment of the whole body of statutes; and though in determining the meaning of a statute, we are not to regard it as then enacted for the first time, especially if there be no change in its phraseology, yet, where there is such a change, it follows that the attention of the revisers had been particularly directed to that statute, as of course also that of the legislature, and that with the changes made it expresses the present intent of both. Thus, in this case, it is clear that the revisers gave particular thought to the phraseology of the statute we are considering, and put it in a form that seemed to them best with reference to the present state of things, and decided to leave the words "such persons" to stand with full knowledge that they were sufficient to include women, and that women were already following the profession of law in different parts of the country. The legislators must be presumed to have acted with the same consideration and knowledge. It would have been perfectly easy, if either had thought best, to insert some words of limitation or exclusion, but it was not done. Not only so, but a clause omitted in the revision of 1866 was restored, providing that no "person" not regularly admitted should act as an attorney—a term which necessarily included women, and the insertion of which made it necessary, if the word "persons" as used in the first part of the statute should be held not to include women, to give two entirely different meanings to the same word where occurring twice in the same statute and with regard to the same subject matter.

The object of a revision of statutes is, that there may be such changes made in them as the changes in political and social matters may demand, and where no