Page:History of Woman Suffrage Volume 2.djvu/733

Rh lieving that she had such right. It also appeared that when she offered to vote, the question whether, as a woman, she had a right to vote, was raised by the inspectors, and considered by them in her presence, and they decided that she had a right to vote, and received her vote accordingly.

It was shown on the part of the Government that, on the examination of your petitioner before the commissioner on whose warrant she was arrested, your petitioner stated that she should have voted if allowed to vote, without reference to the advice of the attorney whose opinion she asked; that she was not induced to vote by that opinion; that she had before determined to offer her vote, and had no doubt about her right to vote. At the close of the testimony, your petitioner's counsel proceeded to address the jury, and stated that he desired to present for consideration three propositions, two of law, and one of fact: 1. That your petitioner had a lawful right to vote. 2. That whether she had a right to vote or not, if she honestly believed that she had that right, and voted in good faith in that belief, she was guilty of no crime. 3. That when your petitioner gave her vote she gave it in good faith, believing that it was her right to do so.

That the two first propositions presented questions for the court to decide, and the last question for the jury. When your petitioner's counsel had proceeded thus far, the judge suggested that the counsel had better discuss, in the first place, the questions of law, which the counsel proceeded to do; and, having discussed the two legal questions at length, asked then to say a few words to the jury on the question of fact. The judge then said to the counsel that he thought that had better be left until the views of the court upon the legal questions should be made known.

The district attorney thereupon addressed the court at length upon the legal questions, and at the close of his argument the judge delivered an opinion adverse to the positions of your petitioner's counsel upon both of the legal questions presented, holding that your petitioner was not entitled to vote; and that if she voted in good faith in the belief in fact that she had a right to vote, it would constitute no defense; the ground of the decision on the last point being that your petitioner was bound to know that by the law she was not a legal voter, and that even if she voted in good faith in the contrary belief, it constituted no defense to the crime with which she was charged.

The decision of the judge upon those questions was read from a written document, and at the close of the reading the judge said that the decision of those questions disposed of the case and left no question of fact for the jury, and that he should therefore direct the jury to find a verdict