Page:History of Woman Suffrage Volume 2.djvu/531

Rh There is, however, an adverse claim that is made under the XV. Amendment, which ought to be briefly considered. That claim is that even if the XIV. Amendment gives the right to vote, yet the XV., in prohibiting the denial of the right to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, impliedly confers the right to prohibit it on all other grounds. Now, if it has this effect, it does so merely by impliedly repealing that clause of the XIV. Amendment which provides that the rights of citizens shall not be abridged. But it is a well-established rule of law that a repeal by implication is never favored, and will not be sustained unless the implication is a clear and necessary one. Much more would not such a repeal be sustained where the clause claimed to be repealed was a part of a constitution, and was intended as a security for human rights and liberty. The rule that would favor a construction toward liberty of the XIV. Amendment, would equally forbid a construction toward curtailment of liberty of the XV.

But it will be said that the XV. Amendment becomes without purpose and effect, and really as senseless as we claim the XIV. Amendment to be under the construction which we oppose, if it is to be regarded as operating only in the way claimed, and not as conferring rights not previously existing. This is a point of some force, and which can be replied to only by the fact that there was an impression upon the minds of the legislators and of the people, that the XIV. Amendment did not confer the right of suffrage. That impression weighs nothing in now determining the meaning of the XIV. Amendment; but it furnishes the explanation that seems to be needed of the passage of the XV. Amendment. It was in our view wholly unnecessary, but was generally thought to be necessary. The difference in the two cases is that the XV. Amendment was passed under a supposed necessity, and with, therefore, a complete object; while the XIV. Amendment, under the construction which our opponents give to it, not only conferred nothing, but was believed at the time to confer nothing, and had therefore no purpose whatever. Our view that the XV. Amendment was unnecessary was held by some leading statesmen at the time. Mr. Sumner in the Senate declared it to be so before its passage, and proposed instead of it a mere law of Congress recognizing the right of suffrage and regulating its exercise.

It is at any rate very clear that the construction of the XV. Amendment, which makes it impliedly allow the denial of suffrage on all other grounds than the three stated, can not be sustained. Such rights as those with which it deals will never be allowed in a free constitution like ours to be curtailed or restricted by mere implication. If that construction is adopted—and a State may deny the right to vote on all other grounds but race and color and previous servitude—then, of course, a State may deny the right to all naturalized foreigners, although they have already acquired and enjoyed the right, and may also deny the right to vote to persons of a particular height or color of hair or profession. Indeed, to reduce the case to an absurdity, suppose the women are allowed to vote in Massachusetts, and, being a great majority over the men, turn around and exclude the men. This would be precisely