Page:History of Woman Suffrage Volume 2.djvu/530

502 ished slavery, every inhabitant of the land became a free inhabitant, so that nothing is now added to the force of the term "inhabitant" by prefixing to it the term "free." It follows, therefore, that the XIV. Amendment, under the adverse construction claimed, means only that the persons referred to in it are inhabitants of the land. Let us see, then, how it will read: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States are inhabitants of the United States and the State wherein they reside." This is sheer nonsense. In the construction of an ordinary law, passed by a Legislature in the crowded moments of its last hour, every Court would say that it must, if possible, give the law a construction that will make it have a sensible meaning and effect, and that of two constructions, one of which gives it sense and purpose and the other none, the former is without a question to be preferred. How much more should such a rule be applied to an amendment of a national constitution, deliberately adopted first by Congress and then by three-quarters of the Legislatures of the States?

3. It is a universal rule in the construction of statutes that the construction of an enabling or enlarging statute must be liberal and in the direction of enlargement. This rule is applicable with much greater force to the construction of this amendment, because, in the first place, it is dealing with the most fundamental of all political rights—that of free citizenship in a democracy—and is besides an amendment of a constitution, which is itself the charter of freedom, and the amendment is made for the very purpose of giving larger freedom than that free constitution originally gave. This rule alone is enough to settle the question of the construction of this amendment, especially as the question is between a construction that shall make it an enlargement of liberty and a construction that shall make it confer nothing that was not before possessed.

The whole question thus far has been considered with reference to the XIV. Amendment alone. The XV. Amendment, though, as we think, conferring no new rights, yet should be briefly noticed. That amendment is as follows: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Here it will be seen that the language, in its natural meaning, implies a pre-existing right to vote. It is not pertinent to the creation of a new right, but only to the protection of a right already existing. It is like the case occurring in some of the State constitutions, where it is provided that the right of trial by jury shall not be denied or impaired, in which case it has been held not to confer a new right, but merely to protect, in its then existing form, a right that was enjoyed when the constitution was adopted. This construction of the XV. Amendment, however, though the natural and obvious one, is not a necessary one, since, if there had been no XIV. Amendment, the XV. would undoubtedly be held to create a new right of suffrage. The argument, from the language used, though not without very positive weight, can not be regarded as decisive of the question, and the claim that women are entitled to vote must rest essentially upon the construction of the XIV. Amendment.