Page:History of Woman Suffrage Volume 2.djvu/528

500 and would not be presumed in a law, much less in a constitution. The American authorities are strongly in favor of the larger meaning.

The term is used in the second section of the original Constitution, article four, which provides that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." In Corfield vs. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. R., 380, the court say: "The inquiry is what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States? They may be all comprehended under the following general heads: (Here follows a statement of numerous rights, civil and political, closing as follows:) "To which may be added the elective franchise as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the State in which it is to be exercised." And in the Dred Scott case, 19 Howard, 476, Mr. Justice Daniel says:

And the supreme court of Kentucky, 1 Little R., 333, says:

These are American authorities, and would seem to settle the question that the term has not acquired a distinctive American meaning variant from the well-established general meaning.

It is said, in the next place, and finally, that the second section of the XIV. Amendment shows clearly that the term "citizen" could not have been used in the sense of full citizenship. This objection is the most serious one that the argument encounters. That section, so far as relates to this subject, is as follows:

The consideration of this section is perfectly legitimate in the inquiry as to the meaning of the first section. It is said, with great force, that here is an implied admission that the States retained the power to exclude black men from the right to vote, and it will be asked why, if that right is absolutely conferred by the first section, and is one of the privileges and immunities of citizens which no State may abridge, the amendment does not boldly forbid any such State legislation, instead of merely imposing certain limitations upon the State that should assume to exercise such right of exclusion.

Two answers have been made by public writers on the subject which are merely specious. One is, that if the second section be construed as admitting the right of a State to exclude certain classes of men from the franchise, yet it could not operate as an admission of the right to exclude women. The fallacy here is, that if the citizenship conferred by the first section does not secure against all legislation the right of suffrage to men, it does not secure it to women; the question being merely as to the meaning of the term "citizen" as used, and not as to its application to