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Rh which enumerates certain powers which might otherwise be deemed implied powers within its scope, for in such cases we are not to assume that the affirmative specification excludes all other implications. (2 Story on Constitution, sec. 449.)

There are numerous instances in the Constitution where a general power is given to Congress, and afterward a particular power given, which was included in the former; yet the general power is not to be narrowed, because the particular power is given. On this same principle the fact that by the XV. Amendment the States are specifically forbidden to deny the right of suffrage on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, does not narrow the general provision in the XIV. Amendment which guarantees the privileges of all the citizens against abridgment by the States on any account.

The rule of interpretation relied upon by the committee in their construction of the XV. Amendment is, "that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another," or the specification of particulars is the exclusion of generals. Of these maxims, Judge Story says:

It is claimed by the committee that the second section of the XIV. Amendment implies that the several States may restrict the right of suffrage as to other than male citizens. We may say of this as we have said of the theory of the committee upon the effect of the XV. Amendment. It is a proposal to take away from the citizens guarantees of fundamental rights, by implication, which have been previously given in absolute terms. The first section includes "all citizens" in its guarantees, and includes all the "privileges and immunities" of citizenship and guards them against abridgment, and under no recognized or reasonable rule of construction can it be claimed that by implication from the provisions of the second section the States may not only abridge but entirely destroy one of the highest privileges of the citizen to one-half the citizens of the country. What we have said in relation to the committee's construction of the effect of the XV. Amendment applies equally to this. The object of the first section of this amendment was to secure all the rights, privileges, and immunities of all the citizens against invasion by the States. The object of the second section was to fix a rule or system of apportionment for Representatives and taxation; and the provision referred to, in relation to the exclusion of males from the right of suffrage, might be regarded as in the nature of a penalty in case of denial of that right to that class. While it, to a certain extent, protected that class of citizens, it left the others where the previous provisions of the Constitution placed them. To protect the colored man more fully than was done by that penalty was the object of the XV. Amendment. In no event can it be said to be more than the recognition of an existing fact, that only the male citizens were, by the State laws, allowed to vote, and that existing order of things was recognized in the rule of representation, just as the institution of slavery was recognized in the original Constitution, in the article