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 MONISM OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 619 my thoughts body does not exist as body, nor I myself as soul). (2) The variability of the objects of perception. (3) Sensationalism — all specific differences in consciousness must be conceived as differences in degree, all higher mental processes and states, including thought, as the perceptions and experiences, transformed according to law, of beings which feel, have wants, possess memory, and are capable of spontaneous motion. The subject coincides with its feel- ing of pleasure and pain, from which sensation is distin- guished by its objective content. The illusions of meta- physics are scientifically untenable and practically unneces- sary. Various yearnings, wants, presentiments, hopes, and fancies, it is true, lead beyond the sphere of that which can be checked by sense and experience, but for none of their positions can any sufficient proof be adduced. As physics has discarded transcendent causes and learned how to get along with immanent causes, so ethics also must en- deavor to establish the worth of moral good without excur- sions into the suprasensible. The ethical obligations arise naturally from human relations, from earthly needs. The third volume of Laas's work differs from the earlier ones by conceding the rank of facts to the principles of logic as well as to perception. Aloys Riehl opposes the theory of knowledge (which starts from the fundamental fact of sen- sation) as scientific philosophy to metaphysics as unscien- tific, and banishes the doctrine of the practical ideals from the realm of science into the region of religion and art. Richard Avenarius defends the principle of " pure experi- ence." Sensation, which is all that is left as objectively given after the removal of the subjective additions, con- stitutes the content, and motion the form of being. With the neo-Kantians and the positivists there is associated, thirdly, a coherent group of noiitical thinkers, who, rejecting extramental elements of every kind, look on all conceivable being as merely a conscious content. This monism of consciousness is advocated by W, Schuppe of Greifswald (born 1836 ; Noetical Logic, 1878), J. Rehmke, also of Greifswald {The World as Percept and Concept, 1880; "The Question of the Soul" in vol. ii. of the ZeitscJirift fiir Psychologic, 1891), A. von Leclair {Contributions to a