Page:History of Modern Philosophy (Falckenberg).djvu/599

 SPENCER. 577 man comes to recognize the superiority of the higher and more representative fceh'ngs as guides to action ; this form of self-restraint, however, is characteristic of the non-moral restraints as well, of the political, social, and religious con- trols. From these the moral control proper has emerged — differing from them in that it refers to intrinsic instead of extrinsic effects — and the element of cocrciveness in them, transferred, has generated the feeling of moral compulsion (which, however, " will diminish as fast as moralization increases "). Such a rational ethics, based on the laws which condition welfare rather than on a direct estimation of happiness, and premising the relativity of all pains and pleasures, escapes fundamental objections to the earlier hedonism (<?. g., those to the hedonic calculus) ; and, combining the valuable elements in the divergent ethical theories, yields satisfactory principles for the decision of ethical problems. Egoism takes precedence of altruism ; yet it is in turn dependent on this, and the two, on due consideration, are seen to be co-essential. Entirely divorced from the other, neither is legitimate, and a compromise is the only pos- sibility ; while in the future advancing evolution will bring the two into complete harmony. The goal of the whole process will be the ideal man in the ideal society, the scientific anticipation of which, absolute ethics, promises guidance for the relative and imperfect ethics of the tran- sition period. Examination of the actual, not the professed, ideas and sentiments of men reveals wide variation in moral judg- ments. This is especially true of the "pro-ethical" con- sciousnesses of external authorities, coercions, and opinions — religious, political, and social — by which the mass of man- kind are governed ; and is broadly due to variation in social conditions. Where the need of external co-operation pre- dominates the ethics of enmity develops; where internal, peaceful co-operation is the chief social need the ethics of amity results : and the evolution principle enables us to infer that, as among certain small tribes in the past, so in the great cultivated nations of the future, the life of amity will unqualifiedly prevail. The Ethics of Individual Life