Page:History of Modern Philosophy (Falckenberg).djvu/460

 438 FICHTE. pendent of ethics, and distinguished from the latter by its exclusive reference to external conduct instead of to the disposition and the will. The rule of right gains from the moral law, it is true, new sanction for conscience, but can- not be derived from the law. — The concept of right is to be deduced as a necessary act of the ego, i. r., to be shown a condition of self-consciousness. The ego must posit itself as an individual, and can accomplish this only by positing itself in a relation of right to other finite rational beings ; without a thou, no I. A finite rational being cannot posit itself without ascribing to itself a free activity in an external sense-world; and it cannot effect this latter unless (i) it ascribes free activity to other beings as well, hence not with- out assuming other finite rational beings outside itself, and positing itself as standing in the relatioji of right to them ; and unless (2) it ascribes to itself a material body and posits this as standing under the influence of a per- son outside it. But, further, Fichte considers it pos- sible to deduce the particular constitution both of the external world and of the human body (as the sphere of all free actions possible to the person). In the former there must be present a tough, durable matter capable of resist- ance, and light and air in order to the possibility of inter- course between spirits ; while the latter must be an organ- ized, articulated nature-product, furnished with senses, capable of infinite determination, and adapted to all con- ceivable motions. If a community of free beings, such as has been shown the condition of individual self-consciousness, is to be pos- sible, the following must hold as the law of right : So limit thy freedom that others may be free along with thee. This law is conditioned on the lawful behavior of others. Where this is lacking, where my fellow does not recognize and treat me as a free, rational being, the right of coercion comes in ; coercion, however, is not to be exercised by the individual himself — since then there would be no guaranty either for its successful exercise or for the non- violation of the legal limit — but devolves upon the state. The state takes its origin in the common will of all to unite for the safeguarding of their rights, and determines by /