Page:History of Modern Philosophy (Falckenberg).djvu/454

 432 FJCHTE. the other practical. For it contains the following principles: The ego posits itself as limited by the non-ego — it functions 'j cognitively; and: The ego posits itself as determining the V/ I non-ego — it functions volitionally and actively. (c) The Theoretical Ego. — In positing itself as determined by I the non-ego, the ego is at once passive (affected by something ! other than itself) and active (it posits its own limitation). This is possible only as it posits reality in itself only in part, and transfers to the non-ego so much as it does not posit in itself. Passivity is diminished activity, nega- tion of the totality of reality. From reflection on this relation between ego and non-ego spring the categories of redp rocal d fitgailinalion ^ of causality (the non-ego '^ as the cause of the passion of the ego), and substan-tiality (this passion merely the self-limitation of the ego). The conflict between the causality of the non-ego (by which the ego is affected) and the substantiality of the ego (in which ^ and the activity of which all reality is contained) is resolved only by the assumption of two activities (or, rather, of two opposite directions of one activity) in the ego, one of which (centrifugal, expansive) strives infinitely outward while the other (centripetal or contractile) sets a bo-und to the former, and drives the ego back into itself, where- upon another excursus follows, and a new limitation and return, etc. With every repetition of this double act of production and reflection a special class of representa- 'tions arises. Through th e first l imitation of the in itself unlimited activity " sensation " arises (as a product of the "productive imagination "). Because the €go produces this unconsciously, it appears to be given, brought about by influence from without. The second stage, " intuition," is. reached when the ego reflects on sensation, wheii it opposes to itself something foreign which limits it. Thirdly, by reflection on intuition an " jmage " of that which is intuited is constructed, and, as such, distinguished from a real thing to which the image corresponds ; at this point the categories and the forms of intuition, space and time, appear, which thus arise along with the object.* The observed ego itself, to which, from this standpoint of imagination, it appears
 * The object is a product of the ego only for the observer, not for the