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 KANT'S OMISSIONS. 42S assume it in the author of the system, unless we believe the Critique of Pure Reason the result of the strangest chance, and not the work of intellect. Two men only. Beck, the teacher of the Standpoint, and Jacobi, the clearest mind of the century, are to be mentioned with respect as having risen above the confusion of the time to the perception that Kant teaches idealism, that, according to him, thejobject ij ^not given, but ma de^ Besides the perspicuity which would have prevented these misunderstandings, Fichte misses something further, in Kant's work. Considered as a system Kant's exposi- tions were incomplete ; and, on his own confession, his aim was not to furnish the science itsel f, but only the founda- tion and the materials for it. Therefore, although the Kantian philosophy is established as far as its inner con- tent is concerned, there is still need of earnest work toj systematize the fragments and results which he gives into a firmly connected and impregnable whole. The Wissen-^j schaftslehre takes this completion of idealism for its/ mission. It cannot solve the problem by a commentary on the Kantian writings, nor by the correction and addition of particulars, but only by restoring the whole at a stroke. He alone finds the truth who new creates it in himself, independently and in his own way. Thus Fichte's system contains the same view of the matter as the critical system — the author is aware, runs the preface to the programme, On the Concept of the Science of Knowledge, 1794, " that he ) never will be able to say anything at which Kant has not hinted, immediately or mediately, more or less clearly, before him," — but in his procedure he is entirely independ- ent of the Kantian exposition. We shall first raise the question, What _Jn^ the Kantian philos ophy is in need of ^ complet ion? and, secondly, What method must be adopted / in completing it? Kant discusses the laws of intelligence when they are already applied to objects, without enlightening us con- *^ cerning the ground of these laws. He der ived th e pu re concepts (tjie law s of substaj vtiality, of causality, etc.) from (logic, and thus_rnediately from) experience instead of deducing them from the nature^f intelligence ; similarly he