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 400 KANT. of his philosophy, it is true of the practical part, in which Christian morality has found its scientific expression. If we may justly complain that on the basis of his sharp dis- tinction between legality and morality, between legal duty and virtue-duty, Kant took into account only the legal side of the institutions of marriage and of the state, over- looking the fact that besides these they have a moral im- portance and purpose, if we may demand a social ethic as a supplement to his ethics, which is directed to the duties of the individual alone, yet these and other well-founded desiderata may be attained by slight corrections and by the addition of another story to the Kantian edifice, while the foundations are still retained. The bases are immova- ble. Autonomy, absolute oughtness, the formal character of the law of reason, and the incomparable worth of the pure, disinterested disposition — these are the corner stones of the Kantian, nay, of all morals. 3. Theory of the Beautiful and of Ends in Nature. We now know the laws which the understanding im- poses upon nature and those which reason imposes upon the will. If there is a field in which to be {Sein) and ought to be {Sollen), nature and freedom, which we have thus far been forced to consider antithetical, are reconciled — and that there is such a field is already deducible from the doctrine of the religious postulates (as practical truths or assumptions concerning what is, in behalf of what ought to be), and from the hints concerning a progress in history (in which both powers co-operate toward a common goal) — then the source of its laws is evidently to be sought in that faculty which mediates alike between understanding and reason and between knowing and feeling: in Judgment, as the higher faculty of feeling. Judgment, in the general sense, is the faculty of thinking a particular as contained in a' universal, and exercises a twofold function : as " determi- nant " judgment it subsumes the particular under a given universal (a law), as " reflective " it seeks the universal for a given particular. Since the former coincides with the understanding, we are here concerned only with the reflec-