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 39° KANT. equivalent has an ultimate worth or dignity, and is an object of respect. The legislation vvhicli determines all worth, and with this the disposition which corresponds to it, has a dignity, an unconditioned, incomparable worth, and , lends its subjects, rational beings framed for morality, the advantage of being ends in themselves. " Therefore moral- ity, and humanity so far as it is capable of morality, is that which alone possesses dignity." Accordingly the follow- ing formulation of the moral law may be held equivalent to the first : " So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end, never as a means only." A further addition to the abstract formula of the cate- gorical imperative results from the discussion of the ques- tion, What universal ends admit of subsumption under it, I. ^., stand the test of fitness to be principles of a universal legislation ? Here again Kant stands forth as an arbiter between the contending parties, and, with a firm grasp, combines the useful elements from both sides after winnow-. ing them out from the worthless principles. The majority of the eudemonistic systems, along with the promotion of - private welfare, prescribe the furtherance of universal good without being able to indicate at what point the pur- suit of personal welfare should give way to regard for the good of others, while in the perfectionist systems the social element is wanting or retreats unduly into the background. The principle of happiness represents moral empiricism, the principle of perfection moral rationalism. Kant resolves the antithesis by restricting the theses of the respective parties within their proper limits : " Make tJiine own perfec- tion and the happiness of others the end of thy actions ;" these are the only ends which are at the same time duties. The perfection of others is excluded by the fact that I can- not impart to anyone a good disposition, for everyone must acquire it for himself ; personal happiness by the fact that everyone seeks it naturally. This antithesis (which is crossed by the further distinc- tion between perfect, i. e., indispensable, and imperfect duties) serves as a basis for the division of moral duties into duties toward ourselves and duties toward otlier