Page:History of Modern Philosophy (Falckenberg).djvu/411

 FORMAL CHARACTER OF THE MORAL LAW. 389 every material determination of it. If the categorical im- perative posited definite ends for the will, if it prescribed a direction to definite objects, it could neither be known a priori nor be valid for all rational beings: its apodictic character forbids the admission of empirical elements of every sort.* If we think away all content from the law we retain the form of universal legality, f and gain the formula : " Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation." The possibility of conceiving the principle of volition as a uni- versal law of nature is the criterion of morality. If you are in doubt concerning the moral character of an action or motive simply ask yourself the question, What would be- come of humanity if everyone were to act according to the same principle ? If no one could trust the word of another, or count on aid from others, or be sure of his property and his life, then no social life would be possible. Even a band of robbers cannot exist unless certain laws are respected as inviolable duties. It was indispensable to free the supreme formula of the moral law from all material determinations, i.e., limita- tions. This does not prevent us, however, from afterward giving the abstract outline a more concrete coloring. First of all, the concept of the dignity of persons in con- trast to the utility of things offers itself as an aid to expla- nation and specialization. Things are means whose worth is always relative, consisting in the useful or pleasant effects which they exercise, in the satisfaction of a need or of the taste, they can be replaced by other means, which fulfill the same purpose, and they have a (market or fancy) value ; while that which is above all value and admits of no as to its origin, its content, and its validity. It springs from reason, it con- tains a formal precept only, and its validity is not concerned, whether it meets with obedience or not. It declares what ought to be done, even though this never should be done. t The " formal principle" of the Kantian ethics has met very varied criti- cism. Among others Edmund Pfleiderer {Kantischer Kritizismus und Eng- li<:che Philosophie, i83i) and Zeller express themselves unfavorably, Fortlage and Liebmann (Zur Analysis der Wirklichkeit, 2d ed., 1880, p. 671) favor- ably.
 * The moral law, therefore, is independent of all experience in three respects,