Page:History of Modern Philosophy (Falckenberg).djvu/399

 THE AXTIA'OMIES. ,379 in different senses. The fact that in the world of phenomena the causal nexus proceeds without interruption and without end, so that there is no room in it either for an absolutely necessary Being or for freedom, does not conflict with this other, that beyond the world of sense there may exist an omnipotent, omniscient cause of the world, and an intelli- gible freedom as the ground of our empirically necessary actions. " May exist," since for the critical philosopher, who has learned that every extension of knowledge beyond the limits of experience is impossible, the question can concern only the conceivability of the world-ground and of freedom. This possibility is amply sufficient to give a support for faith, as, on the other hand, it is indispensable in order to satisfy at once the demands of the understanding and of reason, especially to satisfy their practical interests. For if it were not possible to resolve the apparent contra- diction, and to show its members capable of reconciliation, it would be all over either with the possibility of experi- ential knowledge or with the basis of ethics and religion. Without unbroken causal connection, no nature ; without freedom, no morality ; and without a Deity, no religion. Of special interest is the solution of the third antinomy, which is accomplished by means of the valuable (though in the form in which it is given by Kant, untenable) conception of the intelligible character* Man is a citizen of two worlds.. As a being of the senses (phenomenon) he is subject in his volition and action to the control of natural necessity, while as a being of reason (thing in itself) he is free. For science his acts are the inevitable results of precedent phenomena, which, in turn, are themselves empirically caused ; nevertheless moral judgment holds him responsible for his acts. In the one case, they are referred to his em- pirical character, in the other, to his intelligible character. Man cannot act otherwise than he does act, if he be what he is, but he need not be as he is ; the moral constitution of the intelligible character, which reflects itself in the empir- Tetnoval cf. R. Falckenberg, Ueber den intelligiblen Character, zur Kritik <Ur Kantischen Frtiheitslekre ( from the Zeitschrift fur Philosophie, vol. Uxr.). Halle, 1879.
 * On the difficulties in the way of this theory and the possibility of their