Page:History of Modern Philosophy (Falckenberg).djvu/386

 3^4 KANT. significance for the real succession of events. Only the thought of a rule, according to which the antecedent state contains the necessary condition of the consequent state, justifies us in transferring the time order of our representa- tions to phenomena.* Nay, even the distinction between the phenomenon itself, as the object of our representa- tions, and our representations of it, is effected only by subjecting the phenomenon to this rule, which assigns to it its definite position in time after another phenomenon by which it is caused, and thus forbids the inversion of the perceptions. We can derive the rule of the understanding which produces the objective time order of the manifold from experience, only because we have put it into experi- ence, and have first brought experience into being by means of the rule. We recapitulate in Kant's own words : The objective (time) relation of phenomena remains undeter- mined by mere perception (the mere succession in my appre- hension, if it is not determined by means of a rule in rela- tion to an antecedent, does not guarantee any succession-in the object). In order that this may be known as deter- mined, the relation between the two states must be so con- ceived (through the understanding's concept of causality) that it is thereby determined with necessity which of them 'must be taken as coming first, and which second, and not '";Conversely. Thus it is only by subjecting the succession of phenomena to the law of causality that empirical knowl- edge of them is possible. Without the concept of cause ^no objective time determination, and hence, without it, no •experience. That which the relation of cause and effect does for the' succession f of phenomena, the relation of reciprocity does for their coexistence, and that of substance and acci- » dent for their duration. Since absolute time is not an object of perception, the position of phenomena in time can- succession of the representations of their manifold, to tell how this is connected in the object." f Against the objection that cause and effect are frequently, indeed in most cases, simultaneous (e.g., the heated stove and the warmth of the room), Kant remarks that the question concerns the order of time merely, and not the lapse
 * " If phenomena were things in themselves no one would be able, from the