Page:History of Modern Philosophy (Falckenberg).djvu/384

 362 KANT. conditions of experience (sensation) is actual " (perception is*' the only criterion of actuality). "That which, in its connection with the actual, is determined by universal con- ditions of experience, is (exists as) necessary." As the categories of substance and causality are specially preferred to the others by Kant and the Kantians, and are even proclaimed by some as the only fundamental con- cepts, so also the principles of relation have an established reputation for special importance. The leading ideas in the proofs of the " Analogies of Experience " — for in spite of their underivative character the principles require, and are capable of, proof — may next be noted. The time determinations of phenomena, the knowledge of their duration, their succession, and their coexistence, form an indispensable part of our experience, not only of scientific experience, but of everyday experience as well. How is the objectiv e time-dete rmination of_. things— a»d cy cftfes- possible? If the matter in hand is the determina- tion of the particulars of a fight with a bloody ending, the witnesses are questioned and testify : We heard and saw how A began the quarrel by insulting B, and the latter answered the insult with a blow, whereupon A drew his knife and wounded his opponent. Here the succession of perceptions on the part of the persons present is accepted y as a true reproduction of the succession of the actual events. But the succession of perceptions is not always the sure indication of an actual succession : the trees along an avenue are perceived one after the other, while they are in ureality coexistent. We might now propose the following statement: The representation of the manifold of phe- nomena is always successive, I apprehend one part after another. I can decide whether these parts succeed one another in the object also, or whether they are coexistent, j / by the fact that, in the second case, the series of my perceptions is reversible, while in the first it is not. I can, if I choose, direct my glance along the avenue in such a way that I shall begin the second time with the tree at which I left off the first time ; if I wish to assure myself that the parts of a house are coexistent, I cause my eye to wander from the upper to the lower portions, from the right side to the