Page:History of Modern Philosophy (Falckenberg).djvu/374

 352 KANT. in themselves are not ; that in the first of these classes natural causation rules, and in the second freedom ; that in the one.conditioned existence alone is found, in the other unconditioned.* But just as often things in themselves and phenomena are conceived as similar to one another, as two sides of the same object,t of which one, like the counter-earth of the Pythagoreans, always remains turned away from us, while the other is turned toward us, but does not reveal the true being of the object. According to this each particular thing, state, relation, and event in the world of phenomena would have its real counterpart in the noumenal sphere : un-extended roses in themselves would lie back of extended roses, certain non-temporal processes back of their growth and decay, intelligible relations back of their relations in space. This is approximately the relation of the two conceptions as in part taught by Lotze himself, in part represented by him as taught by Kant. Herbart's principle, " So much seeming, so much indication of being " {wie viel Scheinso viel Hindeutung aufs Sein), might also be cited in this connection. That which continually impelled Kant, in spite of his proclamation of the unknowableness of things in themselves, to form ideas about their character, was the moral interest, but this sometimes threw its influ- ence in favor of their commensurability with phenomena and sometimes in the opposite scale. For in his ethics Kant needs the intelligible character or man as noumenon, and must assume as many men in themselves (to be con- sistent, then, in general, as many beings in themselves) as there are in the world of phenomena. But for practical rea- sons, again, the causality of the man in himself must be phenomena, and those concerning the common root of sensibility and under- standing, show the same tendency. On the one hand, duality, on the other, unity. f " Phenomenon, which always has two sides, the one when the object in itself is considered (apart from the way in which it is intuited, and just because of which fact its character always remains problematical), the other when we regard the form of the intuition of this object, which must be sought not in the object in itself, but in the subject to whom the object appears, while it nevertheless actually and necessarily belongs to the phenomenon of this object." " This pred- icate " — sc, spatial quality, extension — "is attributed to things only in so far as Mt-y appear to us."
 * Kant's conjectures concerning a common ground of material and mental